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Part	I:		
Background.		
	
Online	 violence	 against	women	 is	 a	modern	 phenomenon	which	 affects	women	 and	 girls	
worldwide.	Online	violence	against	women	takes	various	forms	of	abuse	and	includes,	but	is	
not	 limited	 to,	 online	misogyny,	 text-based	abuse	 (e.g.	 on	 social	media	platforms	 such	as	
Twitter	 or	 Facebook),	 upskirting,	 image-based	 sexual	 abuse	 (also	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘revenge	
pornography’),	rape	pornography,	doxing,	cyberstalking	and	cyber-harassment.		
	
The	rise	of	online	abuse	against	women	not	only	undermines	the	ideal	of	an	open,	all-inclusive	
and	participatory	 Internet	but	also	demonstrates	 the	pervasiveness	of	gender	 inequalities	
experienced	by	women	in	the	online	environments.	The	silencing	effects	of	online	misogyny	
and	its	negative	impact	on	women’s	free	and	equal	participation	in	the	public	sphere	are	not	
to	be	underestimated	Alarmingly,	a	UK-based	2016	GirlGuiding	Girls’	Attitudes	Survey	shows	
that	49%	of	girls	aged	11-16	and	44%	of	young	women	aged	17-21	do	not	feel	free	to	express	
their	views	online.1	Furthermore,	the	study	confirmed	that	50%	of	girls	and	young	women	
aged	11-21	think	that	sexism	is	worse	online	than	offline,	with	a	further	23%	of	respondents	
having	had	threatening	things	said	about	them	on	social	media.2	
	
Online	misogyny	is	widespread,	especially	on	social	media	and	frequently	takes	the	form	of	
text-based	abuse,	e.g.	 in	 the	 form	of	abusive	and	misogynistic	 tweets.	 The	2016	 study	by	
DEMOS	which	investigated	the	scale	of	misogyny	on	social	media	showed	that	in	the	period	
of	three	weeks	when	the	study	was	taking	place,	6500	users	in	the	UK	were	targeted	by	10	
000	tweets	of	an	explicitly	aggressive	and	misogynistic	nature.3	Internationally,	these	figures	
compare	with	200	000	aggressive	and	misogynistic	tweets	sent	to	80	000	persons	in	the	same	
three	weeks.4		
	
The	wide	scale	of	online	violence	against	women	is	further	confirmed	by	studies	looking	at	
violence	against	women	 from	a	supranational	 level.	The	2014	EU-wide	survey	on	violence	
against	women	 confirmed	 that	whilst	 there	 exists	 a	 variation	 in	 the	 prevalence	 of	 cyber-
harassment	across	Member	States	(between	5	%	and	18	%),	11%	of	women	have	faced	cyber-
harassment	since	the	age	of	15.5	The	survey	also	highlighted	that	the	risk	of	young	women	
aged	between	18	and	29	years	becoming	a	target	of	threatening	and	offensive	advances	on	
the	internet	is	twice	as	high	as	the	risk	for	women	aged	between	40	and	49	years,	and	more	
than	three	times	as	high	as	the	risk	for	women	aged	between	50	and	59	years.6	
	
																																																						
1	Girlguiding,	‘Girls’	Attitudes	Survey	2016’,	p.19	https://www.girlguiding.org.uk/globalassets/docs-and-
resources/research-and-campaigns/girls-attitudes-survey-2016.pdf.	
2	Ibid.,	p.17.	
3	The	study	monitored	specifically	the	use	of	words	‘slut’	and	‘whore’	on	Twitter:	DEMOS	(2016)	‘The	use	of	
misogynistic	terms	on	Twitter’	https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Misogyny-online.pdf.	
4	Ibid.		
5	European	Union	Agency	for	Fundamental	Rights,	Violence	against	women:	an	EU-wide	survey.	Main	results	
(March	2014)	p.104.	
6	Ibid,	p.105.		
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Despite	its	prevalence	and	severe	impact	on	the	victims,	the	recognition	of	online	violence	
against	women	and	its	consequences	has	been	rather	slow,	particularly	when	it	comes	to	legal	
responses	to	this	problem,	both	at	domestic	and	international	levels.	There	exists	a	significant	
disparity	between	states’	 legal	frameworks	regarding	prevention	and	combatting	of	online	
violence	 against	 women.	 Furthermore,	 even	 when	 legislative	 provisions	 which	 allow	
punishment	of	some	acts	of	online	violence	against	women	exist	(most	commonly,	although	
not	exclusively,	through	legal	provisions	tackling	malicious	communications),	the	overall	legal	
landscape	pertaining	to	deal	with	such	offences	is	scattered	and	lacks	consistency.		
	
At	an	international	level,	references	to	online	violence	against	women	have	been	scarce	and	
formulated	 in	 generic	 terms,	without	 giving	due	 recognition	 to	 the	 seriousness,	 scale	 and	
everyday	 impact	 of	 online	 abuse	 of	 women.	 The	 most	 recent	 CEDAW	 General	
Recommendation	 No.	 35	 on	 gender-based	 violence	 against	 women,	 updating	 general	
recommendation	 No.19	 (14	 July	 2017)	 acknowledged	 the	 continuum	 of	 gender-based	
violence	 against	 women	 and	 multiplicity	 of	 its	 forms,	 including	 ‘technology-mediated	
settings’,	as	well	as	its	public	and	cross-jurisdictional	nature.	In	addition,	the	Committee	called	
for	greater	preventative	measures	aimed	at	tackling	online	violence	against	women,	including	
self-regulatory	mechanisms	created	by	online	and	social	media	platforms,	and	stressed	the	
need	 to	 address	 gender-based	 violence	 against	women	which	 takes	 place	 through	 online	
services	and	platforms.7	However,	CEDAW	General	Recommendation	No.35	did	not	elaborate	
further	 regarding	 the	 gender-based	 nature	 of	 online	 abuse	 of	 women	 and	 its	 damaging	
effects,	 nor	 addressed	 in	 greater	 detail	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 states	 in	 preventing	 and	
combatting	online	violence	against	women.		
	
This	 slow	 progress	 has	 been	 further	 undermined	 by	 common	misconceptions	 concerning	
online	acts	of	gender-based	violence.	Online	forms	of	violence	against	women	are	frequently	
perceived	as	‘not	real’	due	to	the	fact	that	abuse	happens	in	the	online	sphere,	including	social	
media.	This	dichotomy	between	‘offline’	and	‘online’	is	not	only	incorrect	when	it	comes	to	
combatting	online	violence	against	women	but	it	also	fails	to	take	into	account	the	fact	that	
boundaries	 between	 ‘online’	 and	 ‘offline’	 aspects	 of	 everyday	 life	 are	 increasingly	
disappearing	in	the	context	of	modern	societies.	Acts	of	online	violence	against	women	take	
place	on	the	Internet,	but	their	effects	are	not	constrained	to	the	online	environment	only.	In	
fact,	in	many	instances,	acts	of	online	violence	against	women	can	later	translate	into	physical	
acts	of	violence.	Furthermore,	the	anonymity	of	perpetrators,	for	instance	in	cases	involving	
text-based	gendered	abuse	on	social	media	platforms,	heightens	the	fear	of	violence	and	the	
overall	 distress	 experienced	 by	 the	 victims.	 In	 cases	 where	 perpetrators	 have	 been	 held	
accountable	 for	 online	 abuse,	 the	 victims	 described	 their	 experiences	 of	 abuse	 as	 ‘life-
changing’	and	emphasised	the	damaging	effects	of	such	abuse	on	their	lives.8						
	
	
	
	 	
																																																						
7	CEDAW,	General	Recommendation	No.	35	on	gender-based	violence	against	women,	updating	general	
recommendation	No.19,	CEDAW/C/GC/35	(14	July	2017),	para.37(a).		
8	R	v	Nimmo	and	Sorley	[2014]	(unreported);	Emma	Holten	‘Learning	from	revenge	porn:	online	rights	are	
human	rights’	(2015)	available	at:	http://bit.ly/2z0VUAI	.	
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Part	II:		
Focus	of	Evidence	to	This	Submission		
	
	
1. Legal	Jurisdictions	within	the	UK.		
	
The	focus	of	this	submission	rests	upon	the	legal	landscape	within	the	multiple	jurisdictions	
that	comprise	the	UK.	Specific	focus	falls	on	two	legally	distinct	jurisdictions,	namely	those	of	
England	&	Wales,	and	of	Scotland.	That	said,	the	legal	picture	is	complicated	still	further	by	
the	fact	that	specific	pieces	of	legislation	are	applicable	across	both	of	these	jurisdictions.	The	
jurisdiction	of	England	&	Wales	has	seen	two	very	high-profile	prosecutions9	brought	against	
so-called	‘trolls’	for	abusive	and	threatening	communications	via	social	media,	specifically	the	
micro-blogging	site	Twitter.		
	
	
2. Text-Based	Abuses.	
	
This	 submission	 focuses	on	aspects	 relating	 to	misogynistic	 text-based	abuses	 rather	 than	
IBSA.	Whilst	both	image-based	and	text-based	abuses	have	extensive	harmful	and	damaging	
effects	on	the	victims,	only	 IBSA	has	benefitted	from	a	 legislative	appetitive	for	reform.	 In	
contrast,	there	has	been	an	alarming	and	complete	lack	of	attention	paid	to	text-based	abuses	
within	the	context	of	legislative	developments.	This	is	concerning,	especially	given	the	harms	
suffered	through	these	forms	of	online	abuse	–	factors	judicially	recognised	in	the	landmark	
case	of	R	v	Nimmo	&	Sorley.	Consequently,	there	is	a	misperception	concerning	the	level	and	
significance	of	harm	that	can	be	inflicted	through	text	–	harms	are	not	only	caused	by	image-
based	abuse.	The	gap	in	legislative	provisions	compounds	the	silencing	of	women	in	public	
spaces	which	 occurs	 through	 the	 legislative	 deficiencies	when	 comparing	 action	 taken	 to	
prosecute	 image-based	 sexual	 abuses	 compared	 with	 the	 inaction	 taken	 for	 text-based	
abuses.	Where	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 action,	 the	 harm	 is	 still	 palpable:	 the	 initial	 harm	 arises	
through	the	abusive	message,	with	a	consequent	harm	resulting	in	silencing	women	in	public	
spaces.	This	is	therefore	not	just	an	issue	of	legislative	reform,	but	also	an	issue	concerning	
the	(in)equality	of	participation	in	public	spaces	both	offline	and	online.			
	
	
3. Harm.		
	
The	authors	appreciate	that	the	issue	of	jurisdiction	in	terms	of	the	Internet	is	a	complicating	
factor	 in	 considerations	of	 online	 abuse,	 but	 it	 is	 important	 to	understand	 the	distinction	
between	the	operation	of	the	Internet,	and	the	legal	jurisdictions	to	which	this	submission	
relates.	That	said,	in	tackling	any	aspect	of	online	abuse,	particularly	online	violence	against	
women,	identifying	the	location	of	the	‘harm’	suffered,	and	the	location	of	the	perpetrator	of	
																																																						
9	R	v	Nimmo	&	Sorley	[2014]	(unreported);	R	v	Viscount	St	Davids	[2017]	(unreported).		
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that	 harm10	 do	not	 necessarily	 correlate	 to	 the	 same	 legal	 jurisdiction	 for	mechanisms	of	
redress.	 This	 problem	 is	 further	 compounded	when	 suggestions	of	 platform	 responsibility	
arise	–	notably	 for	 ‘Internet	 giants’	 such	as	 Twitter,	 Facebook	and	Google,	which	operate	
across	physical	borders,	and	across	legal	jurisdictions.	Issues	of	platform	responsibility	are	not	
to	be	ignored	in	dealing	with	online	abuses,	especially	those	perpetrated	through	social	media	
platforms,	and	judicial	decisions	on	related	points	have	been	made	by	senior	courts	within	
England	&	Wales,11	and	at	a	European	level.12	
	
	
4. Threshold	for	Criminal	Prosecution.		
	
Finally,	some	forms	of	online	abuse	will	be	of	a	sufficiently	serious	standard	to	attract	criminal	
prosecution.	That	said,	it	is	important	to	appreciate	that	not	all	forms	of	abusive	message	will	
reach	 the	 threshold	 for	 prosecution,	 and,	 conversely,	 those	 that	 do,	may	 not	 result	 in	 a	
successful	prosecution.	In	addition,	not	all	online	abuse	will	be	regarded	as	hateful	abuse,	and	
not	all	hateful	speech	will	be	abusive.	Furthermore,	the	underlying	factor	here	is	that	the	age	
of	criminal	responsibility	is	different	in	different	jurisdictions	and,	simply	because	something	
meets	the	threshold,	may	not	mean	that	there	is	a	judicial	remedy	available.		
	
	
	 	
																																																						
10	Complex	legal	questions	arise	here	in	terms	of	the	‘jurisdictional’	competence	of	judicial	and	law-enforcement	
bodies.	This	submission	does	not	seek	to	address	those	in	any	level	of	depth.	
11	R	v	Sheppard	[2010]	1	WLR	2779.	
12	Delfi	v	Estonia	(2015)	ECtHR	64669/09.		
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Part	III:		
Existing	 Legislative	Models,	Criminal	or	Administrative,	on	Prosecuting	and	
Punishing	Various	Forms	of	Online	Violence	Against	Women	
	
	
Within	the	territory	of	the	United	Kingdom,	there	are	separate	 legal	 jurisdictions.	Criminal	
prosecutions	have	different	legal	bases	depending	on	the	jurisdiction,	i.e.	in	England	&	Wales	
and	 in	 Scotland.	 Some	 provisions	 have	 applicability	 across	 the	 UK	 (i.e.	 England	 &	Wales,	
Scotland,	Northern	Ireland)	whereas	others	apply	only	in	individual	jurisdictions	(e.g.	only	in	
Scotland	and	therefore	not	in	England	&	Wales	nor	in	Northern	Ireland).	Accordingly,	there	
are	various	pieces	of	legislation	across	England	&	Wales,	and	Scotland	which	can	be	applicable	
to	regulation	and	punishment	of	online	violence	against	women.		
	
1. UK-wide	(England	&	Wales	and	Scotland)	
	
1.1. Protection	from	Harassment	Act	1997	
Prosecutions	made	under	 this	 provision	 address	 situations	 under	 section	 4	 for	 courses	 of	
conduct.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 a	 successful	 prosecution,	 courses	 of	 conduct	will	 cause	 fear	
where	“a	person	whose	course	of	conduct	causes	another	to	fear,	on	at	least	two	occasions,	
that	violence	will	be	used	against	him”	and	“he	knows	or	ought	to	know	that	his	course	of	
conduct	will	cause	the	other	so	to	fear	on	each	of	those	occasions.”	This	section	addresses	
multiple	 communications	 intended	 to	 create	 a	 course	 of	 conduct	 which	 causes	 fear	 of	
violence.		
	
1.2. Communications	Act	2003	
This	 Act	 introduces	 criminal	 liability	 for	 an	 improper	 use	 of	 a	 public	 electronic	
communications	network	under	 section	127.	Prosecutions	made	under	 this	provision	deal	
with	messages	 or	 other	matter	 that	 is	 “grossly	 offensive”	 or	 of	 an	 “indecent,	 obscene	 or	
menacing	character.”	This	same	section	also	provides	that	it	is	an	offence	to	send	or	cause	to	
be	sent	a	false	message	“for	the	purpose	of	causing	annoyance,	inconvenience	or	needless	
anxiety	to	another.”		
	
	
2. England	&	Wales		
	
2.1. Offences	Against	the	Person	1861	
This	piece	of	 legislation	addresses	more	serious	offences.	 In	 the	context	of	abusive	online	
messages,	this	Act	works	in	conjunction	with	the	Protection	from	Harassment	Act	1997	where	
threats	have	been	made	which	are	threats	to	kill	under	section	16.		
	
2.2. Malicious	Communications	Act	1988	
This	Act	introduces	criminal	liability	for	the	sending	of	offensive	communications	where	there	
is	an	intention	to	cause	distress	or	anxiety.	Under	section	1,	a	criminal	communication	will	be	
one	which	 is	 “indecent	 or	 grossly	 offensive	 or	 which	 conveys	 a	 threat,	 or	 which	 is	 false,	
provided	there	is	an	intention	to	cause	distress	or	anxiety	to	the	recipient.”		
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2.3. Criminal	Justice	and	Courts	Act	2015		
This	Act	 introduces	criminal	 liability	 for	 the	offence	of	 “disclosing	sexual	photographs	and	
films	with	intent	to	cause	distress”	under	section	33	(also	referred	to	as	‘image	based	sexual	
abuse’).	 In	 addition,	 the	 Act	 introduces	 criminal	 liability	 for	 possession	 of	 pornographic	
images	 of	 rape	 and	 assault	 by	 penetration	 (also	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘rape	 pornography)	 under	
section	37.		
	
	
3. Scotland		
	
3.1. Criminal	Justice	and	Licensing	(Scotland)	Act	2010		
This	 legislation	 deals	 with	 similar	 issues	 as	 those	 which	 appear	 in	 the	 Malicious	
Communications	 Act	 1988	 (England	 &	 Wales).	 Under	 the	 2010	 Act,	 an	 offence	 will	 be	
committed	if	there	is	behaviour	which	is	“threatening	or	abusive”	and	which	would	either	be	
likely	to	cause	“a	reasonable	person	to	suffer	fear	or	alarm”	under	section	38(1)(b)	or	which	
“intends	by	the	behaviour	to	cause	fear	or	alarm	or	is	reckless	as	to	whether	the	behaviour	
would	cause	fear	or	alarm”	under	section	38(1)(c).	The	“threatening	and	abusive”	behaviour	
can	 apply	 equally	 to	 things	 said	or	 things	done,	 and	 can	be	 a	 singular	 act,	 or	 a	 course	of	
conduct.		
	
This	provision	also	allows	for	custodial	sentences	of	periods	up	to	five	years	under	section	
38(4)	 –	 a	 distinguishing	 point	 from	 the	 similar	 criminal	 acts	 under	 the	 Malicious	
Communications	Act	(England	&	Wales),	where	custodial	sentences	are	issued	for	a	maximum	
period	of	two	years.		
	
3.2. Abusive	Behaviour	and	Sexual	Harm	(Scotland)	Act	2016	
Part	1,	section	2	of	the	Abusive	Behaviour	and	Sexual	Harm	(Scotland)	Act	2016	introduces	
criminal	offences	for	disclosing,	or	threatening	to	disclose,	an	intimate	photograph	or	film.	
These	provisions	are	the	equivalent	provisions	to	those	located	within	the	Criminal	Justice	
and	Courts	Act	2015	(which	applies	to	only	England	&	Wales).		
	
	
4. Council	of	Europe	&	Online	Violence	Against	Women		
	
Article	17	of	the	Istanbul	Convention	2011	
Article	17	of	the	Council	of	Europe	Convention	on	preventing	and	combatting	violence	against	
women	and	domestic	violence	(‘the	Istanbul	Convention’)	foresees	shared	responsibility	of	
state	parties	with	the	media	providers	and	information	and	technology	sector	for	preventing	
violence	against	women.	The	provision	encourages	the	parties	to	work	together	to	produce	
appropriate	 self-regulatory	 standards	 and	 guidelines	 and	 to	 effectively	 implement	 them.	
Whilst	Article	17	does	not	 specifically	 address	online	violence	against	women	or	 lists	 acts	
which	amount	 to	such	 form	of	violence,	 the	scope	and	purpose	of	 the	Convention	should	
indicate	a	reading	inclusive	of	acts	of	violence	against	women	committed	online,	especially	
using	social	media.	Furthermore,	such	interpretation	would	comply	with	the	overall	scope		
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and	 purpose	 of	 the	 Convention	which	 explicitly	 recognises	 violence	 against	 women	 as	 ‘a	
major	obstacle	to	the	achievement	of	equality	between	women	and	men’	(Preamble).		
	
At	present	(November	2017),	the	UK	has	not	yet	ratified	the	Istanbul	Convention.	However,	
on	24	April	2017,	Preventing	and	Combating	Violence	Against	Women	and	Domestic	Violence	
(Ratification	of	Convention)	Bill	2017	received	Royal	Assent,	therefore	becoming	the	law	in	
the	UK.	 This	 legislation	 commits	 the	UK	Government	 to	 take	 requisite	 steps	 to	 ratify	 the	
Istanbul	Convention.			
	
	
5. Comment	on	Existing	Legislative	Models		
	
Whilst	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 legislative	 mechanisms	 pertaining	 to	 issues	 of	 online	
communications	–	especially	those	of	a	malicious	nature	–	these	are	spread	across	disparate	
instruments	 operating	 at	 different	 levels	 across	 differing	 legal	 systems.	 This	 creates	 a	
confused	system	as	these	various	sporadic	legal	provisions	fail	to	address	the	phenomenon	
of	online	violence	against	women	and	contributes	to	the	silencing	of	women	in	public	spaces,	
most	notably	the	Internet.		
	
These	overlapping	legal	provisions	mean	that	some	aspects	of	the	criminal	law	dealing	with	
communications	offences	 create	overlaps	 in	 the	 law	–	particularly	 between	 the	Malicious	
Communications	 Act	 1988	 and	 the	 Communications	 Act	 2003	 –	 but	 also	 this	 leads	 to	
situations	where	there	are	‘gaps’	in	the	legal	provisions.	This	reflects	an	incoherent	approach	
to	tackling	online	violence	against	women.	In	addition	to	this,	there	are	contradictory	legal	
terms	 (and	 tests)	 used	 within	 the	 numerous	 legal	 instruments,	 ranging	 from	 hostility,	 to	
prejudice,	 to	 bias.	 This	 is	 compounded	 by	 the	 confused	 approaches	 to	 ‘abusive’	 and	
‘threatening’	 behaviour,	 all	 of	which	when	 considered	 together	 indicates	 inconsistency	of	
thinking	 and	 an	 inconsistent	 policy	 approach	 to	 existing	 legislative	 models	 aimed	 at	
prosecuting	and	punishing	 forms	of	 violence	against	women.	Furthermore,	 this	 leads	 to	a	
situation	 whereby	 the	 legal	 threshold13	 for	 successful	 criminal	 prosecutions	 under	 the	
Malicious	Communications	Act	1988	and	Communications	Act	2003	 is	 incredibly	high,	and	
often	unreachable	when	considered	alongside	the	need	for	prosecutions	to	be	‘in	the	public	
interest.’		
	
Despite	 this	 criticism,	 recent	 efforts	 have	been	made	 to	 tackle	 selected	 aspects	 of	 online	
violence	against	women.	The	caveat	to	this	–	a	significant	caveat	–	is	that	the	focus	has	fallen	
only	on	visual	or	image-based	sexual	abuses.14	Whilst	this	is	perceived	as	a	positive	step,	this	
creates	a	gap	in	the	current	legislative	landscape	across	the	various	jurisdictions	within	the	
UK	where	image-based	sexual	abuses	are	potentially	subject	to	criminal	prosecution	yet	text-	
																																																						
13	 The	 threshold	 for	 prosecution	 attracted	 criticism	 from	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 Parliamentary	 Assembly	
Committee	on	Equality	&	Non-Discrimination,	a	point	highlighted	in	the	report	by	Ms	Marit	Maij	(the	Rapporteur	
of	 the	 Committee).	 Council	 of	 Europe,	 ‘Report:	 Ending	 cyber-discrimination	 and	online	 hate’	Doc.14217	 (13	
December	2016),	para.32,	available	at:	http://bit.ly/2hX6mPA	.	
14	This	refers	to	rape	pornography,	revenge	pornography	or	other	intimate	images.	
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based	abuses	are	not.15	To	 illustrate	 this	point,	both	England	&	Wales,	and	Scotland	have	
introduced	 specific	 legislation	 to	 prosecute	 so-called	 ‘revenge	 porn’	 yet	 no	 legislative	
developments	have	been	forthcoming	to	tackle	the	equally	harmful	misogynistic	text-based	
abuses.16		
	 	
																																																						
15	Text-based	abuse	(TBA)	refers	to	specific	threatening	messages	sent	predominantly	through	communications	
networks	such	as	social	media	platforms,	and	includes	rape-threats,	death	threats	and	other	messages	directed	
at	female	participants	on	social	media	networks.		
16	This	recommendation	was	made	by	the	authors	(Dr	Kim	Barker	and	Dr	Olga	Jurasz)	as	a	part	of	the	submission	
to	 the	 Scottish	 Parliament’s	 Public	 Audit	 and	 Post-Legislative	 Scrutiny	 Committee	 in	 July	 2017	 (copy	 of	 the	
submission	 on	 file	 with	 authors	 and	 available	 upon	 request	 by	 emailing	 kimberley.barker@stir.ac.uk	 or	
olga.jurasz@open.ac.uk	).		
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Part	IV:		
Existing	 Policies	 that	 Allow	 Identification,	 Reporting	 and	 Rectification	 of	
Incidents	of	Harassment	or	Violence	Against	Women	via	the	Internet	Services	
Providers.		
	
	
1. The	IT	Companies	–	Code	of	Conduct		
	
Given	 the	 pressure	 on	 social	media	 platform	providers	 –	 notably	 Twitter	 and	 Facebook	 –
announcements	have	been	made	of	 initiatives	and	changes	such	providers	have	sought	to	
implement	as	part	of	a	scheme	to	identify	and	report	incidents	of	harassment	and	violence.	
Unfortunately,	 the	 emphasis	 to	 date	 has	 fallen	 on	 aspects	 such	 as	 ‘hateful	 conduct’17	 or	
‘terror-related	content.’18	 In	addressing	 issues	of	harassment	and	violence	against	women	
online,	 the	 European	 Commission	 together	 with	 ‘The	 IT	 Companies’19	 announced	 in	May	
2016,	 a	 ‘Code	of	Conduct	on	 Illegal	Hate	 Speech.’20	Whilst	 undoubtedly	 this	 has	 signalled	
progress	 in	 terms	 of	 encouraging	 the	 ‘IT	 Companies’	 to	 play	 a	 more	 responsible	 role	 in	
monitoring	the	content	posted	via	their	platforms,	it	is	only	by	agreement	that	such	initiatives	
have	made	any	progress.		
	
	
2. The	IT	Companies	–	‘Mute	Buttons’		
	
Other	mechanisms	introduced	by	the	platforms	specifically	have	included	things	like	‘mute	
buttons’	on	Twitter	which	allow	 individual	users	 to	 ‘hide’	certain	content	 from	their	 feed.	
Again,	whilst	this	is	a	potentially	positive	measure	–	especially	as	an	indicator	of	Twitter	taking	
the	 issue	 seriously	 –	 this	 is	 not	 a	 solution	 to	 the	problem.	 The	 abusive	messages	 are	 not	
‘removed’	if	muted	–	they	remain,	but	are	simply	hidden	from	the	view	of	the	person	to	whom	
they	 were	 communicated.	 This	 is,	 therefore,	 essentially	 nothing	 other	 than	 a	 silencing	
mechanism	in	action.			
	
	
3. Service	Provider	Liability		
	
This	 is	 symptomatic	 of	 a	 much	 broader	 problem	 –	 and	 that	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 liability	 which	
attaches	to	the	platform	providers	at	present	in	terms	of	the	sending	of	the	messages	and	the	
harm	which	is	inflicted	upon	those	receiving	the	messages.	Partly	this	is	due	to	jurisdictional	
issues,	but	this	is	also	due	to	provisions	at	a	European	Union	level	which	do	not	appear	to	
																																																						
17	L	La,	‘Twitter	updates	rules	to	combat	abusive	behaviour,	hateful	conduct’	(WIRED	News,	29	December	
2015):	https://www.cnet.com/news/twitter-updates-rules-to-combat-abusive-behavior-hateful-conduct/	.	
18	BBC	News,	‘Tech	firms	to	remove	extremist	posts	within	hours’	(20	October	2017):	
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-41693777	.	
19	Notably	Facebook,	YouTube,	Twitter	&	Microsoft.	
20	EU	Commission,	‘EU	Commission	and	IT	Companies	announce	Code	of	Conduct	on	Illegal	Online	Hate	
Speech’	(31	May	2016):	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm.		
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introduce	any	general	monitoring	duty	on	intermediaries.21	However,	there	are	suggestions	
(again	at	a	European	level)	that	the	European	Commission	is	considering	altering	that	general	
approach,	and	instead,	introducing	stricter	measures	aimed	at	enhancing	the	responsibility	
of	platform	providers	for	illegal	online	content.22	Most	notably,	the	suggestion	offered	seems	
to	 include	 a	 system	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 ‘notice	 &	 takedown’	 and	 is	 therefore	 likely	 to	 be	
controversial	in	light	of	freedom	of	expression	rights.		
	
4. Local	Police	Force	&	‘Labelling	Gender-Based	Hate’		
Finally,	 at	 a	 national	 level,	 several	 police	 forces	 in	 England	 and	 Wales	 have	 recently	
announced	 that	 they	 will	 be	 recording	 incidents	 of	 hate	 crime	 with	 additional	 labels23	 –	
notably	as	misogynistic	incidents.	This	seems	to	be	a	significant	step	forward	in	terms	of	the	
recognition	of	gender-based	abuses	more	broadly	but,	unfortunately,	this	results	only	in	the	
recording	of	offences	locally.	The	labelling	and	‘flagging’	of	such	incidents	bears	no	correlation	
to	the	prosecution	of	crimes	on	a	similar	basis	–	and,	indeed,	this	is	impossible	as	under	hate	
crime	laws	in	England	&	Wales,	and	Scotland,	gender	is	not	a	protected	characteristic.	As	such,	
whilst	 local	 police	 forces	may	 be	willing	 to	 record	 potential	 crimes	 as	 gender-based	 hate	
crimes,	this	is	something	which	is	legally	unfounded	and	has	no	bearing	on	the	judicial	system,	
as	the	recording	has	no	impact	upon	prosecution	rates.	This	behaviour	is,	therefore,	at	best,	
a	 matter	 of	 identification,	 although	 there	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 any	 shared	 nor	 any	
transparent	basis	on	which	the	various	police	forces	are	making	such	recordings.	
	
	
5. Comment	on	Existing	Policies		
	
The	existing	policies	here	 indicate	 that	 there	 is	an	awareness	of	 the	potential	harm	–	and	
perhaps	even	a	partial	willingness	–	to	act	in	order	to	tackle	issues	of	harassment	and	violence	
against	women	online.	There	are	number	of	sporadic	and	piecemeal	mechanisms	that	have	
been	implemented	by	the	social	media	platforms	in	order	to	offer	so-called	solutions.		
	
These	existing	policies	span	a	number	of	different	approaches	but	have,	 to	date,	 failed	 to	
engage	or	interact	or	complement	the	disparate	legislative	measures	used	to	address	some	–	
limited	–	incidences	of	online	violence	against	women.	Whilst	it	is	apparent	that	there	can	be	
a	willingness	to	discuss	potential	policies	and	measures,	the	lack	of	any	substantive	policies	
addressing	online	violence	against	women,	particularly	text-based	abuses,	speaks	volumes	–	
especially	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 action	 taken	 in	 respect	 of	 image-based	 abuses	 and	
extremist	 content.	 This	 is,	 therefore,	 indicative	of	 a	 lack	of	 commitment	 to	 implementing	
effective	mechanisms	to	tackle	abusive	behaviours	online.	Similar	 to	the	 lack	of	 legislative	
action	on	misogynistic	text-based	abuses,	there	has	been	little	real	impetus	given	to	service	
																																																						
21	Article	15,	E-Commerce	Directive	2000/31/EC.  
22	EU	Commission,	‘Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	The	Council,	The	
European	Economic	and	Social	Committee	and	the	Committee	of	the	Regions:	Tackling	Illegal	Content	Online	–	
Towards	an	Enhanced	Responsibility	of	Online	Platforms.’	COM	(2017)	555.		
23	E	Ashcroft,	‘Cat-calling	and	wolf-whistling	now	classed	as	gender-hate	crimes	by	Avon	and	Somerset	Police’	
(Bristol	Post,	16	October	2017)	http://bit.ly/2gBpUg1.		
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provider	 or	 platform	 provider	 policies	 –	 evidence	 of	 a	 further	 systemic	 failure	 in	 tackling	
harmful	behaviour.		
	
The	 lack	 of	 impetus	 given	 to	 the	 service	 provider	 policies	 and	 scatter-gun	 approaches	
implemented	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	actions	of	local	police	forces	who	are	sporadically	
declaring	their	 intentions	to	label	and	record	crimes	as	potential	gender-hate	crimes.	This,	
whilst	a	positive	 indicator,	represents	 little	more	than	acts	of	symbolism.	There	 is	no	 legal	
basis	in	England	&	Wales,	or	Scotland	for	labelling	incidents	as	gender-based	hate	crimes,	and	
this	oddity	is	compounded	by	the	lack	of	judicial	impact	or	rectification	of	such	‘flagging’	and	
recording.	 When	 this,	 together	 with	 the	 polices	 of	 service	 providers	 is	 considered,	 the	
evidence	is	overwhelming	that	there	has	been	little	‘joined-up’	thinking	to	date	in	addressing	
issues	of	online	violence	against	women	–	 irrespective	of	whether	they	are	text	or	 image-
based.		 	
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Part	V:		
Existing	Jurisprudence	from	International,	Regional,	and	National	Courts,	on	
Prosecution	or	Administrative	Proceedings	in	Such	Cases.		
	
	
1. R	v	Nimmo	&	Sorley	[2014]	(unreported)		
	
The	 case	 concerned	 online	 abuse	 of	 a	 feminist	 campaigner,	 Caroline	 Criado-Perez,	 and	 a	
politician,	 Stella	 Creasy	MP	 by	 the	 defendants:	 John	Nimmo	 and	 Isabella	 Sorley.	 In	 2013,	
Caroline	 Criado-Perez	 led	 a	 successful	 campaign	 to	 include	more	women	 on	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	banknotes	–	something	publically	endorsed	and	supported	by	Stella	Creasy.	In	July	
2013,	Nimmo	and	Sorley	posted	multiple	tweets	from	their	Twitter	accounts	which	were	of	
menacing	character	and	directed	towards	both	Criado-Perez	and	Creasy.	The	tweets	included	
threats	of	violence	(including	sexual	violence)	and	used	extreme	and	offensive	language.	The	
defendants	were	 both	 charged	with	 –	 and	 entered	 guilty	 pleas	 to	 –	 separate	 offences	 of	
improper	use	of	a	public	electronic	communications	network,	contrary	to	section	127	of	the	
Communications	Act	2003.		
	
The	judgment	in	R	v	Nimmo	and	Sorley	marked	the	first	prosecution	of	Twitter	trolls	under	
section	127	Communications	Act	2003.	It	gave	important	and	long-awaited	recognition	to	the	
harms	caused	by	online	abuse	and	the	effects	it	has	on	the	victims	–	something	highlighted	
by	Judge	Riddle	in	his	sentencing	remarks.	Important	recognition	was	given	to	the	economic	
dimensions	of	the	harms	suffered	by	the	victims.	It	was	acknowledged	by	Judge	Riddle	that	
recipients	of	the	menacing	tweets	had	to	spend	a	significant	amount	of	time	and	money	to	
remain	 ‘as	 untrackable	 as	 possible’.	 Judge	Riddle	 also	 stressed	 that	 the	 anonymity	 of	 the	
perpetrators	was	 a	 factor	which	heightened	 the	 fear	 of	 the	 recipients	 of	 the	 tweets,	 and	
contributed	to	their	substantial	distress.		
	
	
2. R	v	Viscount	St	Davids	[2017]	(unreported)		
	
The	case	arose	in	the	context	of	the	aftermath	of	the	Brexit	referendum.	It	concerned	the	
online	abuse	by	Lord	St.	Davids	of	Gina	Miller,	a	high-profile	remainer	who	challenged	the	UK	
Government’s	approach	to	Brexit	through	the	English	courts.	The	defendant	posted	menacing	
content	 about	 Gina	Miller	 on	 his	 Facebook	 page.	 This	 included	 the	 depiction	 of	Miller	 in	
derogatory	terms	and	putting	a	bounty	of	£5000	on	Mrs	Miller’s	head.	The	court	found	that	
the	defendant	intended	the	content	of	his	post	to	be	of	menacing	character	and	also	had	the	
knowledge	that	this	content	(once	posted)	would	be	repeatedly	shared	by	other	users.	The	
offence	 committed	by	 Lord	St.	Davids	was	also	 found	 to	be	 racially	 aggravated,	 therefore	
giving	rise	to	a	higher	sentence.		
	
The	sentencing	remarks	of	Judge	Arbuthnot	made	several	significant	points.	It	was	highlighted	
that	 the	 public	 profile	 of	 the	 victim	was	 irrelevant	 to	 consideration	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
offence	on	her.	Furthermore,	the	grossly	offensive,	racist,	and	threatening	character	of	the	
Facebook	post	was	stressed,	including	the	acknowledgement	of	additional	personal	security		
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measures	which	had	to	be	employed	by	Mrs	Miller	in	the	aftermath	of	Lord	St.	Davids’	post.	
The	 extreme	 racial	 abuse	 and	 the	 distress	 caused	 to	 Mrs	 Miller	 were	 of	 paramount	
consideration	for	the	court	at	the	sentencing	stage,	leading	to	the	handing	down	of	a	sentence	
amounting	to	12	weeks	immediate	imprisonment	(as	opposed	to	8	weeks	which	would	have	
been	handed	down	if	not	for	the	racially	aggravating	feature).		
	
	
3. Comment	on	Existing	Jurisprudence		
	
The	 examples	 of	 cases	 referred	 to	 above	 arose	 primarily	 due	 to	 the	 high	 profile	 of	 the	
claimants.	It	is	recognised	that	public	figures	(both	women	and	men)	are	frequently	victims	
of	text-based	abuse.	However,	as	stressed	by	Judge	Arbuthnot	in	R	v	Viscount	St	Davids,	public	
figures	do	not	deserve	to	be	victims	of	such	‘warped	behaviour’.	Equally,	the	scale	and	impact	
of	 text-based	 abuse	 on	 individuals	without	 public	 profiles	 should	 not	 be	 underestimated.	
Whilst	the	prosecutions	of	text-based	abuses	remain	relatively	rare	and	restricted	(thus	far)	
to	high	profile	cases,	adequate	legislative	provisions	dealing	with	such	forms	of	abuse	should	
be	created	and	enforced.	As	the	case	of	image-based	sexual	abuse	goes	to	show,	enactment	
of	 adequate	and	 specific	 legislation	dealing	with	 the	 issue	 can	 lead	 to	a	 rise	 in	 successful	
prosecutions	 of	 perpetrators	 of	 such	 crimes.	 According	 to	 the	 Crown	 Prosecution	 Service	
Violence	Against	Women	and	Girls	Report	2016-17,	following	the	introduction	of	legislation	
criminalising	‘rape	pornography’	and	‘revenge	porn’	in	2015,	there	was	a	substantial	rise	in	
commenced	prosecutions	in	relation	to	these	offences.24		In	short,	the	key	point	here	is	that	
the	profile	of	the	alleged	victim	should	be	entirely	irrelevant	in	terms	of	the	alleged	abuse	
received	–	the	harm	and	the	impact	of	the	harm	should	be	the	determining	features	in	tackling	
issues	 of	 online	 abuse.	 Unfortunately,	 this	 is	 yet	 to	 be	 recognised	 expressly	 by	 the	 legal	
system.		
	 	
																																																						
24	There	were	24	prosecutions	of	rape	pornography	in	2016–17,	a	rise	from	three	in	2015–16.	There	were	465	
prosecutions	commenced	of	the	offence	of	disclosing	private	sexual	images	without	consent	(so-called	
revenge	pornography)	a	rise	from	206	in	the	previous	year.	Crown	Prosecution	Service,	Violence	Against	
Women	and	Girls	Report	2016-17.	Tenth	Edition	(October	2017)	16,	available	at:	
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps-vawg-report-2017.pdf	.	
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Part	VI:		
Conclusions.	
	
Preventing	and	combatting	online	violence	against	women	 is	 an	 issue	 in	pressing	need	of	
global	and	domestic	recognition	as	well	as	action.	Addressing	online	violence	against	women	
needs	 to	 start	 from	 recognizing	 the	 existence	 of	 online	 gender-based	 abuse,	 its	 scale,	
numerous	forms,	and	the	extensive	impact	it	has	on	women	and	girls.		
	
Furthermore,	 preventing	 acts	 of	 online	 violence	 against	 women	 as	 well	 as	 establishing	
accountability	for	them	needs	to	be	prioritised	within	multiple	legal	frameworks	–	preferably	
within	 those	 frameworks	 dealing	 with	 issues	 concerning	 online	 communications	 and	 the	
governance	of	online	space.		
	
Finally,	online	violence	against	women	needs	 to	be	 recognised	as	a	 form	of	gender-based	
abuse	 of	women	 and	 girls	 as	well	 as	 a	 factor	 standing	 in	 the	way	 of	 their	 full	 and	 equal	
participation	in	public	and	online	spaces.		
	
As	such,	the	evidence	presented	here	supports	the	following	conclusions:		
	
	
i. The	phenomenon	of	online	violence	against	women	 is	widespread	and	 increasingly	
prolific.		
	
ii. The	authors	respect	the	notion	of	freedom	of	expression	and	reiterate	here	that	there	
must	always	be	a	balance	struck	between	addressing	abusive	communications	which	
reach	 a	 certain	 threshold	 that	 could	 lead	 to	 criminal	 prosecution,	 and	 those	
communications	which	may	be	distasteful	but	not	necessarily	of	a	sufficiently	serious	
nature	that	they	ought	to	be	prosecuted	under	relevant	criminal	law	provisions.	
	
iii. The	criminal	threshold	for	prosecution	within	England	&	Wales	is	widely	accepted	as	
being	too	high,	and	the	lack	of	prosecutorial	action	in	this	area	is	a	further	indicator	
that	this	is	a	barrier	to	tackling	online	violence	against	women	–	especially	where	that	
violence	is	text-based.		
	
iv. There	is	a	minimum	of	seven	distinct	pieces	of	legislation	that	attempt	to	deal	with	
issues	of	harmful	or	abusive	communications	across	the	legally	distinct	jurisdictions	
comprising	the	UK.	None	of	these	have	to	date	proved	adequate	in	tackling	aspects	of	
online	violence	against	women.		
	
v. The	 harms	 caused	 by	 image-based	 sexual	 abuses	 are	 widely	 recognised	 yet	 the	
equivalent	 harms	 for	 text-based	 abuses	 have	not	 been	 afforded	 the	 same	 level	 of	
attention	 despite	 high-profile	 cases	 where	 these	 issues	 have	 been	 judicially	
addressed.		
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vi. Within	England	&	Wales,	and	Scotland,	specific	legislation	has	been	enacted	to	tackle	
the	problems	of	image-based	violence	against	women	in	the	form	of	criminal	offences	
to	tackle	revenge	pornography	and	rage	pornography.	No	similar	provisions	have	been	
enacted	to	tackle	text-based	abuses.		
	
vii. Providers	 and	 social	 media	 platforms	 have	 been	 engaged	 in	 discussions	 aimed	 at	
tackling	 forms	 of	 online	 abuse	 broadly,	 but	 these	 –	 to	 date	 –	 have	 proved	 to	 be	
ineffective	and	 largely	piecemeal	when	compared	 to	 the	measures	 taken	 to	 tackle	
extremist	content	online.		
	
viii. Legal	regulation	cannot	be	the	only	form	of	regulation	which	is	considered	within	the	
context	of	online	abuse	–	and	especially	where	that	abuse	takes	the	form	of	violence	
against	women.	To	allow	these	criminal	acts	to	continue	is	to	allow	the	silencing	of	
women	to	continue	–	and	that,	in	our	digital	age,	means	excluding	women	from	public	
spaces	in	an	online	(and	offline)	context.		
	
